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Tamara Ketabgian, The Lives of Machines: The Industrial Imaginary in Victorian Literature
and Culture. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011. 252 pp. ISBN 0472051407.
Reviewed by Stella Pratt-Smith, University of Oxford
There are few more pervasive metaphors in our conceptualizations of the human than the
industrial imaginary explored by Tamara Ketabgian in The Lives of Machines. The “fuel” of food
saves us from “running out of steam” or becoming “broken” components within an “overheated”
economy; these metaphors are akin to Ketabgian’s example from Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley
(1849) in which Robert Moore exclaims that “the machinery of all my nature, the whole enginery
of this human mill, the boiler which I take to be the heart, is fit to burst” (1). What makes
Ketabgian’s approach innovative, though, is that it moves beyond the trope of the body as
machine, to mine further nuances of industrial metaphor and technology that are, as she suggests,
“rooted in complex models of affect, community, intelligence, energy and life itself” (2). Her
focus is on the writings of such leading mid-century authors as George Eliot, Charles Dickens,
and Elizabeth Gaskell, which she relates in thought-provoking ways to the wider literary and
publication contexts of British culture from the 1830s to the 1870s. Ketabgian’s innovative and
perceptive approach saw the book shortlisted for the British Society for Literature and Science
annual book prize in 2012, and she opens up the true range of conceptual relationships between
machines, culture and humanness. In doing so, she reveals the many unique and metaphorically
suggestive insights their interaction offers for our understandings of what it is to be human.
Ketabgian’s compelling new approach to nineteenth-century machines and technology proposes
that machines “had a rich figurative life, yielding a broad literary array of habits, feelings,
communities, and subjectivities” (2). What this seeks to overturn is the more commonplace
contention that Victorian machines are “simply soulless, lifeless, predictable, and
unidimensional; not simply opposed to organic feeling and vitality; and not simply reductive
material objects--if objects are ever so” (2), represented by studies such as Nichols Fox’s
excellent monograph Against the Machine: The Hidden Luddite Tradition in Literature, Art, and
Individual Lives(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2002). Ketabgian’s proposition contributes,
instead, to the current resurgence of interest in the machine’s role in nineteenth-century material
cultures. Herbert Sussmans’s Victorian Technology: Invention, Innovation, and the Rise of the
Machine (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009) investigates, for example, how the energy and
inventiveness of nineteenth-century industrial cultures provided the foundation for subsequent
material and consumer cultures, while Deirdre Coleman and Hilary Fraser’s essay collection
Minds, Bodies, Machines, 1770-1930 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK; New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) explores how technology impacted conceptions of language,
consciousness, human cognition, and boundaries between materialist and esoteric sciences,
during the nineteenth-century “age of machinery.” Ketabgian seeks to offer “a more inclusive
history of technoculture” (3), in which humans became part of machinery rather than being just
extended or contained by it, and where body parts and machines are endowed with agency.
While her approach might seem to relate directly to Bill Brown’s “thing theory,” as much as to
Heideggerian philosophical distinctions about nature, her ability to resist getting bogged down in
either demonstrates elegance and scholarly maturity. Her observations are also particularly
important just now, when scholarly focus on the body in nineteenth-century literature is
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becoming increasingly worn, and critical interest continues to grow in literary engagements
between nineteenth-century industrial, machine and material cultures.
Ketabgian reminds us of the extent to which the “tale of degraded mechanical feeling” relies on
accounts of the “deadening effects of technology” from Matthew Arnold and John Ruskin, as
leading members of an overly dominant “Victorian anti-industrial elite” (8). Ketabgian steers
clear of discussing Romantic stances towards industry, perhaps because the contributions they
make to this one-sided narrative might seem almost too obvious. It is worth noting here, though,
the doom-laden oppositions between humans and machines popularized by William Blake and
Lord Byron, as much as by William Wordsworth and Johann Wolfgang Goethe, which
supplanted seventeenth-century ideas of mechanical vibrancy from René Descartes’s machinebody in Traité de l’homme (written in the early 1630s, and published posthumously in 1662), to
Thomas Hobbes’s proposition in Leviathan (1651) that the self-sustaining movement of engines
and clockwork mechanisms might represent alternative forms of artificial life. Ketabgian notes,
instead, the negativity towards the industrial, mechanical and technological that spreads from the
nineteenth century into twentieth-century accounts of culture by F. R. Leavis and Raymond
Williams, as well as New Historicist criticism. She observes that “after all, so many of our
popular accounts of Victorian alienation are Modernist formulations” (9), a comment that may
prompt us to read in a new light the “Modernist” flavor of Victorian ambivalence towards
industry and machine technologies, evident in works such as Thomas Carlyle’s "Signs of the
Times" (1829) or William Morris’s News from Nowhere (1890). Beyond this, though, Ketabgian
asserts boldly that “to redefine the machine more flexibly we must also reassess the literature of
the machine, questioning established critical categories that have obscured its scope and
complexity” (4), and her rigorous and innovative research more than bears out this central
contention, making the book highly persuasive, accessible and engaging.
The Lives of Machines is structured in three parts, under “Prosthesis," “Animal Machine” and
"Energy System." In her first chapter, Ketabgian recalls Samuel Butler’s question of whether the
Victorian worker was a “prosthetic attachment” to the machine or, in fact, the machine was a
prosthetic organ of the human body (17). She uses this as a launching point for her examination
of the hybrid machine-human, the fragmentation of the body into appendages and parts, and “the
notion of a full complete body” (18) that was destabilized by such authors as Charles Babbage,
Butler, Harriet Martineau and Karl Marx. Ketabgian explains, for example, how the dominance
of machinery, manufacture and factories in Marx’s Capital contributed to “a radically altered and
foreshortened notion of the human” (20) and how Scottish scholar and chemist Andrew Ure
valorizes the “vast automaton” of the nineteenth-century factory in The Philosophy of
Manufactures (1835), and how it absorbs and transforms workers with its scale and rhythms of
“unvarying regularity” (22). Ketabgian notes how the machinery of the textile factories “literally
dwarfs its female workers” so that they become a “sparse dotting of heads” and “humans and
machines become literally interchangeable” (22). Set against the vast new industrial machines
and the further extended backdrops newly revealed by Victorian geological and evolutionary
theories, human life must have seemed even more impossibly tiny, fragile and vulnerable.
Ketabgian’s study illustrates the shifts of perspective that took place as a result of Victorian
technological developments. The anxieties they induced also seem strikingly similar to today’s
concerns about human entanglements with the seemingly infinite and ubiquitous worldwide
“web.”
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Ketabgian’s investigation into Dickens’s oft-cited characterization of factory machines as
“melancholy mad elephants” in Hard Times (1854) is especially thorough. She sets out
succinctly the mechanistic seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophies that created
common conceptions of the “animal machine” (50), before she goes on to demonstrate how
nineteenth-century engines emerged as distinctly motorized, “virile and energetic” (51). Rather
than focusing on the gendered and reproductive nuances of this phrase, she shows how factories
and machines were increasingly credited with vitality, animality and agency, not least because
nineteenth-century industrial contexts brought workers into such relentlessly and physically close
proximity to machines. Particularly rewarding is Ketabgian’s reading of the circus manager Mr.
Sleary’s lisping account of a murderously violent elephant, in terms of colonial fantasies of
“Asiatic despotism” (58) and the propensity of machines to switch suddenly from servility to
revolt. One of the reasons why Ketabgian’s research is so convincing and interesting is her deft
referencing and alignment of diverse sources. In this chapter, alongside Dickens’s novel, she
quotes in quick succession from an article in Household Words and Sketches by Boz, a lecture by
Michael Faraday, and the labor-movement periodical, the British Labourer’s Protector (1832), to
name but a few. The range of genres Ketabgian employs to illustrate her thesis is adventurous yet
always relevant, strikingly highlighting just how integrated these processes were within the
period’s publication, scientific and political cultures. Ketabgian’s discussion might have been
enhanced here by the inclusion of more illustrations from popular journals and newspapers, like
The Illustrated London News, which also influenced nineteenth-century readers’ perceptions and
shaped how they visualized the nature of machines.
"Brute appetites" are also the focus of Ketabgian’s study of Elizabeth Gaskell’s Mary Barton
(1848). While Victorian machine cultures have long been presented as alienating and
dehumanizing, Ketabgian proposes that fictions and metaphors about them also convey “intense
and specifically industrial forms of affect, appetite and ritual” (72). Workers’ appetites are
represented, she suggests, as excessive, bestial and irrational, particularly the emotional cravings
for food portrayed in Gaskell’s intriguing short story, “Libbie Marsh’s Three Eras” (1847).
Ketabgian reaches beyond the already familiar rhetorical objections to Victorian industrialization
to reveal how it was questioned by means of statistical documentation in non-fiction. She
reproduces, for example, a table published in Artisans and Machinery (1836) by Peter Gaskell,
Elizabeth Gaskell’s distant cousin, which charts correlations between increases in machine
productivity and vices such as drunkenness, debauchery, crime and poverty (78), between 1821
and 1832. It is fascinating to see an early example of the type of statistical survey that was more
frequently undertaken and published by such social critics as Henry Mayhew in the late 1840s
and early 1850s. Ketabgian describes how connected the lives and occupations of Victorian
workers were perceived to be, through further interesting conceptualizations by Victorian critics
including William Cooke Taylor and Friedrich Engels. As Ketabgian indicates, they describe “a
recurring circuit of industrial stimulation and resulting fatigue” (82), in which “associated with a
deficit of energy outside of the factory, mechanized labor is a shadowy presence behind
working-class efforts to find other recreational sources of excitement” (83). The energies of
humans and machines are conflated in a single, complex, cultural system, the discussion of
which might have been just as appropriate in the book’s subsequent and final section “Energy
System.”
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Ketabgian’s penultimate chapter attempts to recognize how contentious and speculative theories
about the physical world continued to be, despite the establishment of certain facts. Throughout
the nineteenth century considerable space was created for uncertainty, contradiction and
speculation, resulting in what Martin Willis describes as a confusing “heterogeneity” (71) of
early competing electrical theories (Mesmerists, Monsters, and Machines [Kent, Ohio: Kent
State University Press, 2006]). Ketabgian discusses the “industrializing [of] human sensation and
perception” (107), particularly in relation to Victorian water and steam power in George Eliot’s
Mill on the Floss (1860), and she suggests that the steam engine was often visualized both as a
natural energy system and as a diffuse metaphorical principle “in other period texts” and
“popular mid-century portraits.” Examples of these and the particular names of the “midVictorian physicists and physiologists” (110) she mentions might make this assertion more
rigorously, as later when she mentions Faraday, W. R. Grove and Hermann von Helmholtz.
Ketabgian suggests that these three pioneers promoted an “expansive view of force” (120). She
quotes Faraday’s claim that “force can neither be created nor destroyed” (120), from his essay
“On the Conservation of Force,” which was published in Experimental Researches (1859).
There is a danger, in this chapter entitled “Psychic Forces,” that contemporary investigations and
interpretations of physical “force” might be misconstrued. While it is certainly the case that
“psychic” powers were open to investigation, it needs to be clarified that, with very few
exceptions, they were not generally the focus of investigation by mainstream physical sciences.
A degree of overlap existed between them, in the work of the Society for Psychical Research,
founded in 1882; on the whole, however, they operated within different spheres and according to
different empirical standards. Ketabgian’s reference to the “psychic” could seem to suggest
otherwise, since the term tends to imply essentially indefinable forces. Although conceptions of
physical “forces” and “energy” certainly resisted definition in the mid-nineteenth century,
considerable headway had been made in measuring their properties, and their constituent parts
and behavior could be demonstrated and predicted according to specific laws of
thermodynamics.
The anxieties that surrounded early theorizing about “unseen” forces in the physical universe
should also be noted, to offset any misguided impression that the hard-won facts of nineteenthcentury science might also have been matters of certainty. Ketabgian observes, for example, that
Faraday’s theory of “conserved” force was not the same as earlier claims for “convertible” force;
that, even when force appears to be dissipated, it is actually converted to other forms, such as
heat, magnetism, chemical action, or motion. In his original 1857 paper, Faraday may have
appeared to promote an “expansive” view of force, but he also added an addendum in 1859, in
which he sought to define more clearly what he really meant by the term “force,” fearing that his
earlier argument may have been found “very obscure” and “not stated the matter with sufficient
precision.” His wish to clarify illustrates what was the simultaneous speculative yet “scientific”
nature of nineteenth-century explorations.
The interaction between machinery and nineteenth-century energy sciences provides a valuable
backdrop for Ketabgian’s reading of Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss as a “natural-force machine”
(138). She reads “The Great Rescue” persuasively as a depiction of “mechanical restraint and
diffusion,” with Tom’s stance in the mill waters and his castigation of Maggie’s “formless
drifting” operating as “Smilesian and Carlylean images of heroically canalized waterpower.” The
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reference to psychic forces is more relevant here, in relation to fiction, particularly in
Ketabgian’s elegant assertion that “although Tom argues otherwise, ‘conquering’ psychic force
is impossible in The Mill on the Floss. Like other forms of energy, it may be channelled or
converted, but not destroyed.” She observes insightfully the resonance between water and steam
displayed throughout the novel, “as powers fuelling a cycle of narrowness and expansion” (143)
in terms of setting and characters, history and community. Importantly, she also points out the
notable caveat that, despite the “prominent cultural sway of the ‘unity’ of force,” Eliot’s
narrative incorporates an equally significant lack of resolution and uncertainty. It is particularly
rewarding that Ketabgian tells us of how Eliot “owned, annotated, and likely consulted” (139)
somewhat obscure books such as T. D. Lauder’s Great Floods of August, 1829, in the Province
of Moray (1830), and that she includes a passage marked in Eliot’s hand about the network of
courses being constructed across the country, to channel water from bogs, rivers and rain. These
inclusions contribute very usefully to our understanding of the embeddedness of fiction and how,
in the process of writing, authors like Eliot often drew directly upon contemporary non-fiction
and interdisciplinary sources.
All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy, and Ketabgian’s final chapter takes this into
account by focusing on that icon of Victorian bourgeois leisure, the piano. Recalling the piano’s
popular contemporary moniker as a “musical steam machine,” she explores depictions of musical
performance and virtuosity in George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda (1876) and in the lesser-known
popular novel Marianne Withers (1851) by Geraldine Jewsbury, alongside contemporary essays
and sketches of the piano virtuosi Franz Liszt and Anton Rubenstein. This final chapter adds a
valuable degree of interdisciplinarity to Ketabgian’s study, making it an even more worthwhile
resource for researchers of literary and cultural contexts. She suggests herself that the book urges
us to “rethink the aesthetic aims, effects and experiences for which we read period texts,” in
“posing an alternate industrial model of character” (167). This aim differs substantially from
Ivan Raykoff’s recent study of “Piano, Telegraph, Typewriter: Listening to the Language of
Touch,” published in Media, Technology, and Literature in the Nineteenth Century: Image,
Sound, Touch, ed. Colette Colligan and Margaret Linley (Ashgate, 2011). Both studies discuss
the Viennese pianist, composer and teacher Carl Czerny. Ketabgian suggests that George Eliot
shared Czerny’s teaching philosophy that “mechanical discipline supports the pursuit of artistic
mastery” (158), although of course innate talent is also emphasized by Klesmer in Daniel
Deronda as the truly essential requirement for musicians. Ketabgian makes the point that Eliot’s
and Jewsbury’s novels extol “industrial regularity as a standard of conduct as useful as it is
beautiful” (158), a perceptive observation that might also be applied more widely.
Ketabgian’s study of interactions between humans and machines goes beyond over-simplified or
figurative notions of personification, metaphor and anthropomorphism, to explore the question
that she phrases as “what might it mean to feel like a machine?” (163). The invention and
introduction of machines to everyday and working life meant Victorians were confronted with
entities capable of moving, making sound and existing, almost independently of human agency.
Ketabgian’s book reveals both the hopes and the anxieties this provoked, during a period when
the possibilities for control--of the self, of objects, and of the inherent interactivity between the
two--seemed constantly shifting and elusive, as well as newly available and exciting.
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